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Over the last fifty years, Noam Chomsky has played a pivotal role in the 
development of modern generative linguistics and has provided the impetus for a 
recent evolution of linguistic theory, the Principles and Parameters approach, 
currently embedded within the Minimalist Program, an effort to investigate the 
role of deeper organizing principles in language design. Chomsky has also been 
a key figure in the development of cognitive science in general: his theory of 
generative grammar was an important factor in the development of the cognitive 
revolution of the 1950s (see Chomsky 2004b), and our current conception of the 
working and the architecture of the mind owes much to ideas drawn from his 
work. Perhaps less widely known is Chomsky’s key role in analytic (Anglo-
American) philosophy, though he has significantly contributed to the 
philosophical study of language and mind over the past fifty years (see Chomsky 
1975, 1980 among others), defending his internalist and naturalistic approach to 
language, while at the same time critically commenting on the empiricist 
philosophical proposals of Willard Van Orman Quine, Michael Dummett, Hilary 
Putnam, and Donald Davidson, among others.  
New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind is Chomsky’s most 
recent contribution to the philosophy of mind and language. The book is a 
collection of seven essays, accompanied by a foreword by Neil Smith, most of 
which have previously been published (the earliest about fifteen years ago), but 
in rather diverse places, hence collecting them all in a single volume allows the 
reader to get a broader overview of the spectrum of philosophical issues 
discussed by Chomsky over the last fifteen years. In these essays Chomsky 
covers philosophical topics of a wide range, addressing central problems and 
long-standing debates in the philosophical study of language and mind: the 
mind-body dichotomy, the problem of consciousness, methodological naturalism 
vs. methodological dualism in studying the mental, the metaphysics and the 
epistemology of meaning, the nature of language and reference, investigations of 
radical translation and radical interpretation, and public vs. private language, just 
to mention some of the issues that the essays focus on. The volume also 
discusses Chomsky’s fascinating new approach to the study of language, the 
Minimalist Program, which provides the possibility to raise new questions that 
were previously impossible even to formulate, let alone address (for recent 
158 Tímea Friedrich
discussions of the Minimalist Program, see Chomsky 2001, 2002, 2004a, 2006, 
Boeckx 2006). 
In the foreword, the work is seen as “clearing some of the underbrush of 
confusion and prejudice which has infected the philosophical study of language”
(p. vi.) and mind. This statement reflects Chomsky’s sharp criticisms of 
influential philosophical proposals in the study of mind and language throughout 
the book and his conclusion that much of the philosophical discussion in this 
domain is wholly misconceived (see Stone and Davies 2002). Chomsky, 
however, not only challenges empiricist philosophical objections raised to his 
internalist and naturalistic approach to language, but at the same time supports 
his own view of the nature of language with compelling evidence. Linguists, 
philosophers, cognitive scientists, and scholars interested in what the latest 
developments in the internalist and naturalistic study of language might imply 
for the philosophical study of this unique human possession and wishing to gain 
some insight into the philosophical debates on mind and language will welcome 
this collection of essays. It is also an essential reading for anyone interested in 
Chomsky’s thoughts on language in general. This review cannot address all the 
topics covered in the volume as their range is too vast to consider each in detail, 
and instead will focus on those that reappear throughout the book and most 
directly relate to Chomsky’s own approach to language. 
A distinction between the notions I-language and E-language was first 
proposed in Chomsky 1986. E-language (“E” to suggest “external”,
“extensional”) is something outside the mind/brain of individuals, a shared 
social construct. I-language (where “I” stands for “internal”, “individual”, and 
“intensional”), in contrast, is internal to the brain of an individual: it is a state of 
some component of the human mind/brain, namely, an attained state of a 
specialized cognitive organ dedicated to language, the faculty of language FL. 
Chomsky argues that the notion “E-language” cannot be coherently specified, 
and E-languages are not appropriate objects for scientific inquiry; rather, what 
the scientific study of language should concentrate on as the objects of inquiry 
are I-languages. Chomsky adopts and defends this internalist view of language 
in the present volume of essays and argues against externalist conceptions of 
language, claiming that the notion of language as an object external to the 
human mind/brain is fundamentally incoherent, in other words, language cannot 
be treated as an entity existing outside and independently of human beings. 
Accordingly, the philosophical tradition that views language as an external 
object, seeking a relation between language and the external world, fails to 
account for the essential properties and nature of human language. According to 
the purely internalist approach that Chomsky adopts, the true nature of language 
can only be captured if we understand it to be something internal to the human 
mind/brain, in which case knowledge of language is interpreted as the linguistic 
competence that an individual possesses in his/her mind/brain, i.e. an I-language. 
In other words, I-language is the internalized linguistic knowledge of a native 
speaker of a language that is mentally represented in his/her mind/brain, a 
mental construct which is identified with our knowledge of language. The 
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strictly internalist study of language that Chomsky advocates, namely, I-
linguistics, concerns itself with mental representations and computations and the 
performance systems that access them in the use of language. Consequently, the 
central object of study in such an approach is the human FL, the initial state of 
FL, the states that FL later assumes and the infinite array of internal expressions 
that the I-language (an attained steady state of FL) generates. FL is regarded as a 
mental organ embedded within and interacting with other cognitive systems of 
the mind/brain (systems which are language-external but organism-internal) at 
two interface levels, the sensorimotor (SM) system related to sound and the 
conceptual-intentional (C-I) system related to meaning. An I-language is an 
attained state of FL, consisting of a Lexicon and a computational procedure 
which is capable of generating an infinite number of expressions, each a 
complex of properties that serve as instructions to SM and C-I systems with 
which FL interacts (for a detailed discussion, see Chomsky 2001, 2002, 2004a, 
2005, 2006, forthcoming; for discussions on the nature, the evolution and the 
autonomy of FL, see Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch 2002, Fitch, Hauser and 
Chomsky 2005, Pinker and Jackendoff 2005, Jackendoff and Pinker 2005).  
A corollary of this internalist view of language is that linguistics “can 
reasonably be interpreted as part of psychology or, more broadly, human 
biology” (p. 1.) (the study of language in a biological setting is termed 
“biolinguistics”). That is, the approach to our knowledge of language that 
understands it to be a state of a cognitive module of the mind/brain views 
language as a psychological, and ultimately a biological object, insofar as FL is 
part of our biological endowment, an organ of the body that actually exists in the 
human brain, and I-language is understood to be an internal state of an organ, 
FL. In this respect, both FL and I-languages qualify as natural, real objects, 
physically realized in the human brain, hence should be studied as elements of 
the natural world, on a par with the visual system, for example. In other words, 
language should be studied just like any other biological system, and the study 
of language is in fact the study of a subcomponent of the human brain at the 
level of abstract (computational-representational) models (on the study of 
language from a biolinguistic perspective, see also Chomsky 1980, 1988). If 
language is regarded as a natural object, Chomsky argues, then the study of 
language falls within naturalistic inquiry, i.e. linguistics is one of the branches of 
natural science. This natural scientific approach to the study of language and 
mind is considered to be the appropriate way to investigate the nature of 
language, which is therefore “to be studied by ordinary methods of empirical 
inquiry” (p. 106.). Thus Chomsky advocates the position of methodological 
naturalism in the study of mind and language, according to which mental aspects 
of the world – including language – should be investigated just like any other 
phenomena – chemical, electrical, optical, etc. – in the natural world that we 
subject to naturalistic inquiry. Once the naturalistic approach to language is 
taken for granted, we should also accept that linguistic theories are assessed by 
the same criteria that any other theory that falls within natural scientific inquiry 
must meet, and it is unwarranted to demand that the analysis of language satisfy 
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constraints in addition to or different from those that apply to other branches of 
natural science, such as chemistry or physics. Further, the theoretical constructs 
and entities posited by linguistics should have the same theoretical status as 
those postulated by theories of physics or chemistry, and we should not impose 
arbitrary stipulations concerning the categories of evidence required for 
confirming linguistic theories. The study of language should proceed the same 
way as any other empirical discipline does: it should follow the Galilean-
Newtonian style in science (see also Chomsky 2002, Boeckx 2006), seeking to 
construct the best theories for the phenomena under investigation, with no 
concern for conformity to common-sense intuitions and aiming at eventual 
unification with the natural sciences. Similarly, as is expected in any branch of 
natural science, naturalistic theories of language and mind should not use 
common-sense concepts of ordinary language in formulating explanatory 
principles. Rather, it is the constructed concepts of the science-forming faculty 
(SFF, another component of the human mind, along with FL), possessing 
properties distinct from those of natural language terms, that enter into 
naturalistic inquiry. Chomsky emphasizes that although the methodological 
principles that apply to a natural scientific approach to language are the same as 
those that are at work in physics or chemistry, this does not entail that linguistics 
can be reduced to physics or the brain sciences; the goal is not reduction, but 
unification, “with no advance doctrine about how, or whether, it can be 
achieved” (p. 112.). 
Most contemporary philosophers of language and mind, however, do not 
adopt methodological naturalism, and adhere to the view that the mental, and 
hence language, should be investigated in some manner distinct from the way we 
study other aspects of the natural world: either tacitly or explicitly, they advocate 
some form of methodological dualism, isolating linguistics and the study of the 
mental from other empirical disciplines. Methodological dualism, in Chomsky’s 
words, is “the view that we must abandon scientific rationality when we study 
humans 'above the neck'… imposing arbitrary stipulations and a priori demands 
of a sort that would never be contemplated in the sciences” (p. 76.) and that “in 
the study of language and mind, naturalistic theory does not suffice: we must 
seek 'philosophical explanations'” (p. 142.). Chomsky explicitly rejects 
methodological dualism, and argues against the non-naturalist assumptions that 
pervade much of the discussion in contemporary philosophy of mind and 
language, critically commenting on the a priori stipulations imposed in the study 
of the mental by philosophers such as Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam, Donald 
Davidson or Willard Van Orman Quine. 
Chomsky’s treatment of the mind-body problem clearly reflects his 
rejection of philosophical dualism. The mind-body problem is the central issue 
in the philosophy of mind that seeks to account for the causal interaction 
between the mental and the physical, in other words, it hopes to find an 
explanation for how mental processes can influence bodily states and how the 
body can affect the mind. Chomsky addresses the problem of mind-body 
dichotomy in several of the essays, and provides a solution by turning to 
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developments in the history of modern science. According to Chomsky, “the 
mind-body problem made sense in terms of the mechanical philosophy that 
Newton undermined, and has not been coherently posed since” (p. 86.). The 
mechanical philosophy was the idea that the natural world is a complex machine, 
and most phenomena of nature can be accounted for in mechanical terms. 
Aspects of human nature like thought and language, however, do not fall within 
mechanical explanation, which led Descartes to formulate his theory of mind-
body dualism, with mind and body postulated to be two distinct substances, thus 
posing a unification problem as to how they interact. This Cartesian model of 
mind-body dualism collapsed when Newton refuted the mechanical philosophy, 
showing that no phenomena in the natural world can be explained in terms of the 
mechanical model. With the abandonment of the mechanical philosophy, there 
remains no coherent concept of body, matter or the physical. Chomsky argues 
that lacking a useful notion of body, we cannot even formulate the mind-body 
problem – not until a new concept of body is proposed. Accordingly, “there is no 
special metaphysical problem associated with attempts to deal naturalistically 
with 'mental' phenomena” (p. viii.): given that the traditional mind-body problem 
disappeared, we can do no more than study the mental along with various other 
aspects of the world, seeking to construct “bodies of doctrine” and hoping for 
unification (on the mind-body problem, see also Chomsky 1988, 2000, 2002, 
2004b; for a critical discussion of Chomsky’s treatment of the mind-body 
problem, see Lycan 2003).  
Both Chomsky’s approach to the nature of meaning and his view on the role 
of consciousness in our knowledge and use of language follow from his 
internalist and naturalistic approach to language. Thus, in an attempt to account 
for the nature of linguistic meaning, Chomsky adopts the position of semantic 
internalism, the view that “meanings are in the head”, as opposed to semantic 
externalism, the idea that meanings are externally determined. Much of 
contemporary philosophy of language advocates externalist theories of meaning 
that seek a relation between linguistic expressions and things in the world and 
ask to what thing a word refers. Chomsky considers such externalist views on 
meaning to be utterly mistaken, arguing that “the question 'to what does the 
word X refer?' has no clear sense… in general, a word, even of the simplest 
kind, does not pick out an entity of the world, or of our 'belief space'” (p. 181.), 
and that there is no coherent notion of reference as a relation holding between 
words and external objects. The approach that Chomsky adopts is semantic 
internalism, according to which words are signs of concepts in our mind, and 
meanings are part of our mental contents. Such an internalist semantics assumes 
that humans possess an array of innate concepts in their minds as part of their 
biological endowment, which is universal among humans and available prior to 
any experience. Accordingly, the task of the child acquiring the vocabulary of 
his/her native language is reduced to discovering what labels are used for 
preexisting concepts (see also Chomsky 1988). Chomsky’s view on 
consciousness as related to our knowledge of language and the products of our 
mind is also a direct corollary of his naturalistic approach. Chomsky explicitly 
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rejects the assumption that takes consciousness to be the mark of the mental and 
the speculation that we have access, in principle, to the linguistic rules that 
constitute our knowledge of language and govern our language use, i.e. that 
linguistic rules are potentially conscious. According to Chomsky, such 
assumptions reflect a form of dualism: he argues that “none of these questions 
arise in naturalistic inquiry, which has no place for such notions as 'access in 
principle' or 'potenitally conscious'” (p. 97.). Chomsky contends that certain 
mental phenomena – among them the principles that make up our knowledge of 
language – are not accessible to consciousness in principle, they lie “beyond 
potential consciousness” (p. 97.) (see also Chomsky 1980). 
New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind is a distinguished 
contribution to the philosophical study of mind and language. This excellent 
work permits the reader a comprehensive and unique insight into Chomsky’s 
views on language and mind. It is remarkable not only for its extraordinary 
scope and breadth of coverage, but also for the wealth of new arguments, 
examples and compelling evidence that Chomsky provides for defending his 
position on language. The importance of this book is enormous in the sense that 
it shows how the results of the scientific study of language might inform 
philosophical discussions of language and mind, and illuminates how historical 
developments and ongoing work in other branches of science might relate to 
developments in linguistics. All in all, this fascinating collection is invaluable 
for all those who are seriously interested in the study of language and mind. 
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